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RECENT DEcIsIoNs
Wis. Stat. (1933) § 118.61; Cf. Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N.W. 1064,
43 Am. St. Rep. 925 (1894). What is a reasonable or an unreasonable time de-
pends on the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business, (if any)
with respect to such instruments and the facts of the particular case. Wis. Stat.
(1933) § 116.01.
Where the payee and the drawee bank are in the same community, in the
absence of special circumstances, it is generally held that the payee has until
the close of the next business day in which to present the check for payment.
Nat. Plumbing and Heating Supply Co. v. Stephenson, 203 II. App. 49 (1918) ;
Aebi v. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N.W. 329, 109 Am. St. Rep. 925,
68 L.R.A. 964 (1905). The fact that the check was given on a legal holiday
does not change the above rule. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. H. M. Brown Coal
Co., 226 Mo. App. 1038, 48 S.W. (2nd) 86 (1932). Where the check is post dated,
it becomes an ordinary check on its date and payable on demand within a rea-
sonable time after date. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339
(C.C.A. 4th, 1924); (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 919. Where the check is received
after banking hours, that day is not counted since no deposit on presentment can
be made after banking hours. Bistline v. Benting, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309
(1924).
Where the payee and the drawee bank are not in the same community, and in
the absence of special circumstances, the check must be forwarded for present-
ment on the next secular day after it has been received, and the agent to whom
it is forwarded must present it for payment on the next secular day after receiv-
ing it. Gifford v. Hardell, supra. The payee is not required to forward the check
by the first mail on the next day after receipt but it is sufficient if the check is
forwarded by the last mail on the day after receipt. Lloyd v. Osborne, 92 Wis. 93,
65 N.W. 859 (1896). The fact that the bank on which a check is drawn is not a
member of the local clearing house does not change the general rules of law as
to the time within which a check must be presented in order to hold the drawer
liable thereon. Lowell Cooperative Bank v. T. F. Sheridan Apt., (Mass. 1934)
188 N.E. 636. Forwarding a check by a circuitous route may, as a general rule,
be said to constitute negligence, except where the check reaches its destination as
soon as if sent directly to the bank. Northern Lwrnber Co. v. Clausen, 201 Iowa
701, 208 N.W. 72 (1926); Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, 135 Iowa 685, 110
N.W. 29, 113 N.W. 476 (1907).
The instant case holds that the payee is not excused from presenting the
check within a reasonable time where he sends a check on a circuitous route,
although it has been the custom of business houses in the community where the
payee does business to present checks through depository banks in different
towns; nor can he be excused by showing that it has been accustomed to pre-
sent the maker's checks through such a depository bank when the maker does
not know of such presentation.
WILui F. HURnEY.
BILLS AND NoTEs-HoLDEs Wrriaour NoncE.-The defendant company
made and recorded a deed of trust to the trustee to secure the defendant's bonds
given in return for a loan. The bonds, bearer instruments, stated on their face
that they were secured by a deed of trust "to which * * * reference is hereby
made with the same effect as though recited at length herein * * * for the pur-
pose of affecting the rights of the holders of the bonds, and the terms and
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conditions upon which said bonds are issued * * *" The trustee in violation of
the deed of trust wrongfully pledged the bonds with the pledgee-petitioning-
banks as security for its own indebtedness. The trustee defaulted on this obliga-
tion and is now bankrupt. The pledgee-petitioning-banks ask permission to sell
the bonds free from any restrictions contained in the deed of trust. The circuit
court of appeals in affirming the district court [6 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Wis. 1934)
aff'd, 70 F. (2d) 815 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934)] held that the pledgee banks were bound
by the restrictions contained in the deed of trust and could not qualify as holders
without notice. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin had previously decided, in a
similar case on identical facts, that parties situated as the pledgees in this case
were holders without notice. Pollard v. Tobin, 211 Wis. 405, 247 N.W. 453 (1933).
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Held, where the state's highest
court has construed the law in a case like the instant case, the federal courts are
bound thereby. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank of Milw. Wis. et al v. Kalt-Zinners
Mfg. Co. et al, 55 Sup. Ct. 226 (1934).
The federal question involved was whether the federal courts were bound
to follow the state court's interpretation of the statute pertaining to notice. Wis.
Stats. (1933) § 116.61. Holding that the federal courts must follow the state
court's ruling (Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 54 Sup. Ct. 813, 78
L.Ed. 1380, 92 A.L.R. 1198 [1934]), the Supreme Court did not pass on the valid-
ity of the state court's interpretation. The validity of the state court's interpreta-
tion is the question for discussion in this recent case.
What constitutes notice of conditions attached to negotiable paper is often
difficult to ascertain. It may arise under the situation where the notice is given by
the terms of the instrument itself. Kreisel v. Balcock, 55 Okla. 487, 154 Pac.
1194 (1915) (a memorandum on note was held sufficient to put indorsee on in-
quiry); Hughes and Co. v. Flint, 61 Wash. 460, 112 Pac. 633 (1911) ("on con-
tract" marked on checks made by a builder to a contractor was held to be
sufficient notice to the indorsee-materialman as to require him to apply such
payment against the accounts for materials furnished on the builder's job).
Notice may sometimes be given from a collateral agreement although the note
itself is absolute in form. Todd v. State Bank, 182 Iowa 276, 165 N.W. 593
(1917) (the contract contemporaneously executed with the negotiable notes and
assigned with them placed the holders on inquiry as to the terms of the contract;
see Tho-mas v. Page, 23 Fed. Cases 963 (C. Ct. Ind. 1843) ; Security
Finance Co. v. Jensen Auto Co., 48 Idaho 376, 282 Pac. 88 (1929). Contra:
National Bank of Watervliet v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 390, 196 N.Y.Supp. 714
(1923) aff'd. on other grounds, 235 N.Y. 611, 139 N.E. 755 (1923), criticized in
8 Corn. L.Q. 243 (1923). Notice may be imputed if the extrinsic facts disclose
an element of bad faith. Security Finance Co. v. Jensen Auto Co., 48 Idaho 376,
282 Pac. 88 (1929) (previous 'dealings under similar circumstances); King
Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 199 N.W. 437 (1924); Monk v. 23d Ward
Bank, 165 N.Y.Supp. 1055 (1917) (suspicious explanation). Cf. Klotz Throwing
Co. v. Mfg'rs. Commercial Co., 179 Fed. 813 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1910).
If there is no actual knowledge of an infirmity in the instrument, to consti-
tute notice of an infirmity, knowledge of such facts that the taking of the in-
strument amounts to bad faith must be shown. Wis. Stats. (1933) § 116.61.
Actual knowledge of the existence of a trust deed is not actual knowledge that
the trustee under the deed is also trustee of the bonds accompanying it where
such fact does not appear on the bond. Pollard v. Tobin, 211 Wis. 405, 247 N.W.
453 (1933). The mere knowledge of the existence of the deed does not consti-
tute such a fact that the taking of the bonds (in pledge for a private loan with-
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out looking to see whether the trust is thereby violated) amounts to bad
faith. Pollard v. Tobin, supra. The latter holding does not seem justifiable when
it is considered that the bonds themselves stated that the deed affected the rights
of the holders and the terms and conditions of issuance. This seems more than
mere knowledge of the existence of the deed. It is a warning sufficient to put
the prospective holder on inquiry. Marine National Exchange Bank et al. v.
Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co. et al., 702 F. (2d) 815 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) (emphasizing
fact that reference on bond states a named trustee) ; King Cattle Co. v. Joseph,
supra (the Minnesota court, confronted with a similar set of facts and involv-
ing the construction of an identical statute [Mason's Minn. Stats, (1927) §
7099], as in the Pollard case, decided that a prospective holder was put on in-
quiry and that failure so to do constituted bad faith).
HENRY G. SCHROEDER.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-PoWER TO CONVERT TO FEDERAL CHARTER.
-Pursuant to the provisions of the Home Owner's Loan Act, 48 Stat. 645, § §
5, 6, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (i), three state building and loan associations made ap-
plication to the Federal Home Loan Bank for conveision into federal savings
and loan associations. An attempt by the Banking Commission, to prevent these
conversions, was enjoined. One of the'associations was accepted, was granted a
charter, and has since operated as a federal association. The other two have not
yet converted. The Banking Commission brings this original action for construc-
tioh of its powers, seeks to have the conversion of the one association declared
void, and asks for an injunction preventing the proposed conversions of the other
two. The issue being identical, all cases were tried together. Held, such conver-
sions, without authority of charter or state consent, are void; and the relief
sought by the plaintiff was granted. Cleary, State ex rel. v. Hopkins St. Building
& Loan Ass'n. (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W. 684.
The charter of a corporation may not be revised or repealed by the creating
state if such act withdraws or violates the obligations of the charter. Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819). The states evaded the
rule of the Dartmouth College case by inserting in their constitutions a clause
reserving full power and control over corporations created under their laws.
Wis. Const. art. XI, § 1; see West Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Board of Supervisors
of Trempealeau County, 35 Wis. 257, 270 (1874) ; Attorney General v. Railroad
Companies, 35 Wis. 425, 574 (1874). This power to control and regulate domestic
corporations has been recognized by federal and state courts. Sherman v. Snmith,
1 Black 587, 17 L.Ed. 163 (1862) ; Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wallace 190,
20 L.Ed. 550 (1871); see Attorney General v. Railroad Companies, supra. This
power, not to be abused, must be exercised only in the protection of state, cor-
porate, and individual rights. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 99 U.S.
700, 719, 25 L.Ed. 496, 498 (1878) ; Miller v. State, 15 Wallace 478, 498, 21 L.Ed.
98, 104 (1872). By virtue of the charter a contractual relationship arises between
the state, the corporation, and the stockholders; such relationship imposing upon
the state a duty to protect the rights of stockholders. See Martin Orchard Co.
v. Fruit Growers' C. Co., 203 Wis. 97, 102, 233 N.W. 603, 607 (1930). A funda-
mental or radical change in the purpose of a corporation cannot be accomplished
over the dissent of a single stockholder. Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N.W.
1031 (1906) (a conversion by a mutual insurance company into a stock company
was held invalid). Could a federal act give state building and loan associations
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